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RECORDING OF EQUIPMENT LEASES: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Introduction
In 1922, the Burroughs Adding Machine Company leased a used adding
machine to the Munger Fish Company for ten months. When the lessee went
bankrupt soon afterward, Burroughs sought to reclaim the machine. The referee
in bankruptcy denied the application on the ground that the "lease" was really
an unrecorded conditional sale and that the lessor's reservation of title was
actually an unperfected security interest in the machine." In 1965, United
Airlines negotiated an unprecedented lease of commercial airliners and by 1971
airlines were leasing an estimated $2 billion worth of airplanes.2 In many other
industries as well, the equipment lease had become an important tool of the busi-
nessman. As a result of this expansion, the burgeoning lease industry has out-
grown traditional legal concepts which may have sufficed in 1925. Particularly
in the field of secured transactions, the legal community has not met the needs of
the business community which have arisen from widespread use of the equipment
leasing device. Under present law, the equipment lease too often has the effect
of a secret lien on the lessee's assets. Limited recording requirements have per-
mitted creditors to be misled by a double deception: a lessee is able to incur
substantial liability of which there is no public record, while reaping the benefits
of ostensible ownership of assets on his business premises.
As in many other areas, the most visible challenge to the lawmaker in the
field of equipment leasing is factual variety. Within the genus are included
transactions of all kinds-from the weekend rental of a wallpapering kit to a ten-
year lease of a half-million dollars worth of linotype machines.' The lessor may
be a manufacturer seeking new markets for his product or a third party which
neither manufactures nor handles the leased equipment.4 The lessee may rely on
leasing only on occasion for specialized, short-term projects or he may lease the
major components of his daily operation. The lessor may enter into many
successive leases of the same item, as in the auto rental business, or he may
seek an agreement which will extend over the entire useful life of the machine
and yield a return of his investment plus a profit in a single transaction.
In business, the motives of lessees who elect against an outright purchase of
their equipment are similarly heterogeneous. Uncertainty as to long-term re-
quirements, the risk of obsolescence, and anticipated tax advantages' are only
1 Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925). The lease con-
tained an option whereby the lessee could purchase the machine at the expiration of the lease
period by payment of an additional month's rent. Id. at 55.
2 Bus. WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 42.
3 See In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966), aff'd sub nor.
Sanders v. National Acceptance Co., 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967).
4 See In re Wright Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 598 (M.D.N.C. 1968); In re Transcon-
tinental Ind., Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 235, 243 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
5 Although the tax aspects of equipment leasing are beyond the scope of this article,
they, are not insignificant. From the lessee's viewpoint, leasing may be advantageous because
rental payments are a fully deductible business expense. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 162(a).
Installment payments on a conditional sales contract are generally considered non-deductible
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some of the factors which may prompt a businessman to lease rather than to
purchase. More often, however, the lease is useful as a method of financing.
Although it is sometimes more expensive than traditional financing devices, the
equipment lease requires less initial capital outlay and may be the only means of
circumventing restrictive covenants under agreements with other lenders.' Ac-
cording to a survey taken in 1968, lessees consider conservation of capital and
the preservation of credit capacity the most important advantages of leasing!
The survey results are borne out by the prevalence of what is called third-party
leasing.' Under such an arrangement, the lessor is actually a financial institu-
tion which acquires the equipment from a supplier for the specific purpose of
filling the needs of the prospective lessee. The article is shipped directly to the
lessee with the lessor never handling it. The lessor recoups his investment, plus
interest, from the rental paid by the lessee under a long-term lease, often with an
option to purchase. Under such circumstances the boundary between lease and
sale often becomes rather difficult to discern. But as the law now stands, only
the most flagrant of these transactions are subject to the filing rules of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. This is due to inadequacies in both statutory and
judicial treatment of equipment leases.
The purpose of this article is to propose amendments to section 1-201(37)
and several sections of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code which would
bring leases of industrial and commercial equipment within the scope of article
9 regardless of whether or not they are intended as security. An equipment lease
would then be treated in the same manner as a sale of accounts, contract rights,
or chattel paper.9 The lessor, like the buyer of such intangibles, would be re-
garded as a secured party.' The validity of his interest in the equipment vis-h-vis
third parties would be subject to the rules of perfection under article 9. Since
leasing arrangements usually contemplate possession by the lessee, it would gen-
erally be necessary for the lessor to give notice of his interest in the leased
property by filing a financing statement.'" The proposed changes are designed to
capital expenditures, except for the interest element of such payments. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 263, 163. On the other hand, if the purchaser can take accelerated depreciation
deductions on the equipment, the rental deductions available through leasing may not be as
attractive. For this reason, among others, the supposed tax advantages accruing to the lessee
have frequently been questioned. Marrah, To Lease or Not to Lease, FIN. ExEc., Oct., 1968,
at 91-104. Indeed some regard the spreading of the investment tax credit as a more signifi-
cant benefit of equipment leasing. Riordan and Duffy, Lease Financing, 24 Bus. LAw. 763
(1969); see Olsen and Wisniewski; Leasing: the Current Tax Picture, 29 J. TAx. 12, 15
(1968). In any event the tax considerations involved are sufficiently strong to have generated
litigation over the question of whether a purported lease is actually a conditional sale. The
Internal Revenue Service has formulated a test which states that the answer depends on "the
intent of the parties as evidenced by the provisions of the agreement, read in the light of the
facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was executed." Rxv. RUL. 55-540,
1955-2 Cut. BULL. 39.
6 Marrah, To Lease or Not to Lease, FIN. ExEC., Oct., 1968, at 96, 100.
7 Id. at 91, 96.
8 A recent estimate attributes 30% of the leasing industry to third-party transactions in-
volving such lessors as banks and finance companies. The same source characterized this type
of leasing as "the fastest growing and most hotly competitive sector of the business." Bus.
WEEK, supra note 2; see Riordan and Duffy, Lease Financing, 24 Bus. LAw. 763 (1969).
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1) (b). Presently proposed changes of this
section would omit the term "contract rights." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNI-
FoRM COMERCIAL CODE, R VIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9, FINAL REPORT, April 25, 1971.
10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1) (i).
11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-302.
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eliminate the inconsistencies of present standards for distinguishing between a
true lease and a conditional sale, and to give the Code a more realistic approach
to the leasing device as it is currently being used.
I. Present Code Treatment of Equipment Leases
Under the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, article 9
applies only to those leases which are "intended as security."'1 2 Although this pro-
vision is unelaborated in article 9, faint guidelines appear in the "General Defini-
tions"--section 1-201. Subsection (37) defines the term "security interest,"
providing in part:
Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title
thereunder is not a "security interest" ..... Whether a lease is intended as
security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the
inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one in-
tended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the
owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal con-
sideration does make the lease one intended for security.
This language has left the courts with at least three questions not answered by
the Code: (1) What facts are indicative of an intent to create a security interest
by means of a lease? (2) Can facts otherwise inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule be consulted on this particular issue? (3) What is a nominal con-
sideration? As shall be seen, the answers of the courts to these problems have
been harmonious with neither themselves nor the Code.
If it is determined that a lease is not intended for security, the transaction
falls completely outside article 9. This will have significance most frequently in
the context of a lessor's reclamation petition which is contested by the trustee in
bankruptcy for the erstwhile lessee. If it is determined that the lease was intended
as security and the lessor has failed to perfect his security interest by filing a
financing statement, his claim for possession will be subordinate to those of the
lessee's lien creditors.'" Under Code section 9-301(3), as,well as section 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act,' 4 the trustee in bankruptcy has the status of such a lien
creditor. As a result, the lessee's bankruptcy may leave the lessor with an un-
secured claim for "rent" and little prospect of recovering his equipment.
II. Judicial Standards: The Option to Purchase
A. Pre-Code Standards
The Code's distinction between a true lease and a lease intended as security
was not unprecedented. The courts have long recognized that some agreements
which purport to be leases are in fact conditional sales contracts in disguise. 5
12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(2).
13 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(1)(b).
14 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
15 See Annots., 175 A.L.R. 1366, 1384 (1948); 92 A.L.R. 304, 323 (1934); 43 A.L.R.
1247, 1257 (1926); 17 A.L.R. 1421, 1435 (1922) and cases discussed therein.
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Prior to the enactment of the Code, various criteria were developed to aid in
deciding when a lease should be regarded as a conditional sale. The most im-
portant of these was the presence and nature of an option to purchase the leased
article. The option price was thought to be inversely related to the likelihood
that the option would be exercised. The greater this likelihood became, the
more apt were the courts to view the agreement as a conditional sale." Oc-
casionally a court would conclude that, under the terms of a particular lease, the
only sensible course for the lessee to follow would be to exercise the option.
On the other hand, if it appeared probable that the demised property would be
returned to the lessor, the agreement would be treated as a true lease. This ap-
proach gave the pre-Code rules a highly formalistic character, as demonstrated
in the case of In re Wright Homes, Inc."8
At issue in the case was the right of the National Acceptance Corporation
to the proceeds from the sale of certain machinery which had passed into the
hands of the trustee upon the bankruptcy of Wright Homes, Inc. The petitioner
claimed to have leased the two machines to the bankrupt under an agreement,
the terms of which are illustrated by the following chart: 9
Purchase Total Rent Price of
Price Over Three- Annual Renewal
Year Term Option
Machine A $12,348.59 $14,358.96 $185.23
Machine B $ 7,600.00 $ 8,837.28 $114.00
The lessee was responsible for all taxes on the machines and for insurance. In
the event of a default, it would be liable in liquidated damages for the unpaid
rent for the entire three-year term, regardless of when the default occurred.
This liability was subject to a deduction of the proceeds from the sale of the
machinery should the lessor elect to sell it after repossession. The effect of the
agreement was that within three years the lessor would recover his entire invest-
ment in the machines (which had a useful life of ten years) plus interest in
excess of 16%, with an additional return of about 1.5% for each renewal year.
These earmarks of a financing arrangement should have had special significance
in light of the court's own observation that the principal business of the lessor
was not the leasing of business equipment, but financing.2" Yet, despite the
obvious purpose of the transaction, the court concluded that it must be con-
16 Id. The annotations state that the principal test was whether the lessee is obligated
"at all events" to pay the purchase price. If so, the agreement would be construed as a con-
ditional sale. If, on the other hand, return of the property was "either required or permitted,"
the agreement would be construed as a true lease. Annots., 175 A.L.R. 1366, 1384 (1948);
92 A.L.R. 304, 323 (1934).
17 In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 327 F.2d 564, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1964); Bur-
roughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1925).
18 279 F. Supp. 598 (M.D.N.C. 1968). Although the case was decided after the enact-
ment of the Code in North Carolina, pre-Code rules apparently governed because the transac-
tion occurred prior to the Code's effective date, June 30, 1967. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-10-101
(1965). The date of the referee's order reviewed in this case was August 7, 1967. 279 F.
Supp. at 599.
19 279 F. Supp. at 600 n.1.
20 Id. at 599.
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sidered a true lease. In so doing the court asserted that no case had ever held
a lease to be a conditional sale in the absence of an option to purchase."1
The disconcerting result of this holding was that the lessee had undertaken
a substantial obligation, secured by machinery in its possession, with no hint in
the public records of either its liability to the lessor or the severe limitations on
its rights in property which it ostensibly owned. The lessor had escaped the duty
to give notice of his claim to the equipment because the transaction lacked the
formal element of a present or contemplated transfer of title. Although the court
was unable to resolve the conceptual riddle, it was painfully aware of the
realities:
It is clear that the agreement here in controversy is, at least in part,
an attempt to circumvent the North Carolina registration requirements for
conditional sales, but the existence of questionable motives cannot detract
from the validity of the agreement as a lease....
It is unfortunate if the creditors of the bankrupt extended additional
credit or neglected to seek satisfaction of overdue debts in the belief that
the machinery named in the agreement would be subject to levy by them.
But creditors fearful of their ability to collect must accept the responsibility
of ascertaining the extent of the debtor's assets. The agreement could have
been demanded of the bankrupt for inspection just as an ordinary lease.""
The court seems to have ignored the fact that the creditors could not demand to
inspect a lease of which they were unaware. Moreover, its advice to creditors is
in conflict with the policy of voluntary disclosure which the filing statutes were
intended to implement. Nonetheless, the court's emphasis on the location of title
conforms to a long line of decisions which have conceived the issue to be whether
the lease in question fits within the mold of a conditional sale.23
B. Judicial Standards Under the Code
Some judges and commentators have concluded that the definition of
"security interest" given in section 1-201 (37) is merely a codification of judicially
developed standards for distinguishing a true lease from a conditional sale.2"
There is good reason to doubt this. The relevant sections of the Code distinguish
the true lease not simply from the conditional sale but from the lease "intended
as security."2 It seems clear that the drafters anticipated leasing arrangements
wherein the lessor's reservation of title was intended as security although the
agreement itself might bear little resemblance to the conditional sale device. The
Official Comments make no reference to pre-existing case law, but the following
21 Id. at 601. At least two cases pre-dating this decision had construed similar agreements
without purchase options to be intended as security under Code § 1-201(37). In re Pomona
Valley Inn, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 893, 894 (C.D. Cal. 1967); In re Transcontinental Ind., Inc.,
3 UCC REP. SERv. 235, 244 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
22 279 F. Supp. at 602-03.
23 Annotations and cases cited supra note 15.
24 In re Oak Mfg., Inc., 6 UCC REP. SERV. 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Hiller, Security
Aspects of Chattel Leases in Bankruptcy, 34 FoRD L. Ray. 439, 441 (1966); Note, 44 BosToN
U. L. REv. 103, 112 (1964).
25 UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(2).
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comment to section 9-102 suggests that the familiar categories of security interests
are no longer adequate for dealing with current innovations in the field of equip-
ment leasing:
When it is found that a security interest as defined in Section 1-201(37)
was intended, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction
or the name by which the parties may have christened it. The list of tra-
ditional security devices in subsection (2) is illustrative only; other old
devices, as well as any new ones which the ingenuity of lawyers may invent,
are included, so long as the requisite intent is found.
It should not be possible, therefore, to avoid the notice requirements of
article 9 by a mere showing that the lease in question is not a "conditional sale."
Even since the enactment of the Code, however, the courts have been slow to
depart from established judicial guidelines and the decisions have in many cases
been unaffected by the new statutory rules. The courts have repeatedly viewed
the issue in terms of alternative interpretations of the agreement in controversy
as either a true lease or a conditional sale. The result has been an inordinate
emphasis on form and conceptual consistency, sometimes with anomalous results.
A 1966 case is illustrative.
In re Atlanta Times, Inc.2" involved a dispute over machines in the posses-
sion of a bankrupt newspaper. After a lease had been executed by the parties,
Commercial Credit Corporation (the lessor) had purchased composing room
equipment designated by the Times (the lessee) at a cost of $570,116.10 and
had it shipped directly to the lessee. 7 The lease was for a term of ten years and
required an initial deposit of $145,000.00 plus equal monthly rentals which
totalled $712,873.20 for an overall cost to the lessee of $857,873.20. The lessee
undertook all responsibility for maintenance, repair, taxes and insurance. It was
found that at the end of the ten-year term the machines would still have sub-
stantial value. At the expiration of the lease, the lessee was to return the property
to CCC in accordance with instructions to be given then. Apparently there was
also an option to renew the lease from year to year at an annual rental of
$5,701.16 (somewhat less than the monthly rental during the initial term).28
The agreement contained express language to the effect that it was a lease, not
a conditional sale, and that the lessee had no interest in the property except the
right to its use. When the lessee became bankrupt, CCC demanded possession
of the machinery or the proceeds of the trustee's auction sale. The trustee con-
tested CCC's claim, arguing that the lease was one intended for security within
the terms of section 1-201(37) and that the lessor had only an unperfected
security interest in the property. The findings and conclusions of the referee,
which the district court adopted, correctly stated the issue to be whether the
26 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966), aff'd sub noma. Sanders v. National Acceptance Co.,
383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967).
27 The terms of the lease appear in 259 F. Supp. at 822, 823.
28 Sanders v. Commercial Credit Corp., 398 F.2d 988, 989 (5th Cir. 1968) (related case
involving the same lease).
[April, 1972]
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lease was "intended as security," 29 but his reasoning reverted to the traditional
lease-sale dichotomy:
The court has been urged to view the transaction as if the total rent
were the purchase price and the monthly rental the equivalent of install-
ments. Such approach to the transaction overlooks the prime, essential
distinction between a lease and a conditional sale, to wit: in a lease the
lessee never owns the property. In the absence of a right or option in the
lessee to acquire ownership of the leased property, the transaction is one
of lease.30
The judgment and reasoning of the court was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals" which later made the incredible comment that there was
"very little if anything in the written instrument itself which subjects it to
suspicion as a masquerade.""
Parol evidence. The predictable result of such mechanical reasoning has
been the growth of evasive tactics by parties attempting to avoid any reference
to the fatal option to purchase. The trustee is then confronted with the parol
evidence rule in his attempt to show the true nature of a purported lease--
especially when the instrument includes clauses which insist that the parties
intend a lease only and that the writing constitutes their agreement in its en-
tirety. One oft-cited case makes reference to the Code version of the rule in
interpreting a disputed lease:
The question presented by the Petition for Review is whether the lease was
intended as security and is to be determined by the facts of the case. In
determining the intent of the parties, we may look only to the language of
the lease itself, which provided that there are no understandings, agreements,
representations or warranties, express or implied, not specified herein, re-
specting this lease or the equipment or service hereinabove described.33
This view is supported both by pre-Code cases3" and by cases decided under the
Code. 5
But the applicability of the parol evidence rule in these circumstances has
not been undisputed. It is arguable, for example, that the rule is superseded by
the provision, in Code section 1-201(37), that the question of whether or not
a lease is intended as security should be determined "by the facts of each case."
This approach is suggested by the recent decision of In re Telemax Corpora,
tion.38 There, the trustee in bankruptcy was permitted to introduce parol
29 259 F. Supp. at 826.
30 Id. at 827.
31 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967).
32 Sanders v. Commercial Credit Corp., 398 F.2d 989, 990 (5th Cir. 1968).
33 In re Wheatland Elec. Prod. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820, 821 (W.D. Pa. 1964) citing PA.
STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-202).
34 Allen v. Cohen, 310 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Gresham, 311 F. Supp. 974,
976 (E.D. Va. 1970); Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, - , 213 A.2d 875, 878 (1965).
35 Sanders v. Commercial Credit Corp., 398 F.2d 988, 990 (5th Cir. 1968); In re Atlanta
Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 825 (N.D. Ga. 1966); In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC
REp. Stnv. 342, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
36 4 CCII SEc. TRANs. Gum- 51,725 (No. 71 B 659, S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1971).
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evidence of an option to purchase in support of his contention that the lease
involved was intended as security. The referee attempted to side-step the issue
by arguing that the tendered evidence would not alter the terms of the lease, but
simply "amplify" them. All that would be affected would be the "legal impact"
of the leases in the context of the lessee's bankruptcy. Though his reasoning
might have been hazy, he clearly perceived the dilemma which he faced:
For the court to rule on the issue here that parol evidence is not admissible,
would be to suggest that in order for a court ever to consider a trustee's
challenge to a so-called lessor's entitlement to property, the instruments
denominated as leases must invariably contain option provisions.7 .
To the extent that the dispute may be regarded as one among the lessee's
creditors, only one of whom (the lessor) is a party to the lease, the promissory
liability of the parties is not really in issue. In this sense the policy of the parol
evidence rule is not violated by the Telemax ruling. But the trustee in bankruptcy
is granted the status of the lessee's successor." Viewed in that light, his offer of
parol evidence may be regarded as directly undermining the contractual obliga-
tion as defined in the instrument. It should be noted, however, that the parol
evidence dilemma itself is born of the courts' own inability to deal with the
financing lease other than in terms of traditional concepts of secured transactions.
A few cases have surmounted the conceptual obstacle presented by the
financing lease which contains no option to purchase. Most notable among
them is In re Transcontinental Industries, Inc.9 The transaction involved in
that case was of the familiar third-party variety. Rentals over a five-year term
exceeded the purchase price by about 20%. Thereafter the lease was renew-
able at an annual rental of 29% of the purchase price (the equivalent of one
month's rent under the original term). The lessee was responsible for repairs,
alterations, insurance, taxes and indemnities and was also to bear the risk of loss
or damage. Additionally, the lease provided for acceleration of the rentals in
the event of default and for payment of the lessor's attorney fees. The court
was not dissuaded by express reservations of title in the lessor or by the absence
of an option to purchase, but recognized the lease to be essentially a financing
arrangement:
Transcontinental needed equipment but had no money to purchase
same without financing; USLO [United States Leasing Corporation] owned
no property of such nature but had arrangements with suppliers who had
prospective sales whereby suppliers could contact them relative to USLO
entering into agreement with prospective buyer and invoice for property
would be sent by vendor to USLO and property delivered to purchaser upon
the signing of a lease agreement; then payment would be made by USLO
to vendor and items of purchase put upon a leasing schedule which would
then be signed by the user ....
37 Id.
38 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.G. § 110(a) (1970).
39 3 UCO Rn,. SEV. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
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From all of these attending facts and circumstances it would appear
that the lessee had no design other than to obtain the equipment and have
someone finance its costs. USLC had no property to lease and had its
concern only on supplying and financing at a profitable rate of earning
and to be surely secure in its doing.
40
The referee concluded that the lease was intended as security and that, since it
had not been filed as required by article 9, the lessor's reservation of title was an
unperfected security interest subordinate to the trustee's claim.4' Unfortunately,
this pragmatic approach is the exception, not the rule.
Nominal consideration. Even where the presence of an option to purchase
is undisputed, the courts have foundered on the further question of whether the
consideration to be paid for the exercise of that option is nominal. Code section
1-201 (37) (b) states that a lease is intended as security if it contains an option
whereby the lessee may become the owner of the property for a norniaal con-
sideration. The precise meaning of the word "nominal" has often been the
subject of litigation. The clause has occasionally been interpreted to refer only
to amounts which are absolutely nominal, such as the sum of one dollar.42 More
frequently, however, it has been interpreted to include an option price which is
nominal under the circumstances, though perhaps substantial in itself.4 Under
this latter rule, standards have varied. Option prices have been compared to the
purchase price of the leased item,44 the rentals to be paid under the lease,45 and
the anticipated market value at the time the option may be exercised. " When
the latter standard is used, the option price must be substantially equivalent to
the fair market value if it is to escape the "nominal" classification. On the
other hand, the option price may be as low as 25% of the purchase price without
causing suspicion that the lease is intended as security."8 One court has even
40 Id. at 243, 244.
41 Id. at 244.
42 In re Falco Prod. Co., 5 UCC RE. SERV. 264, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1968); In re Wheatland
Elec. Prod. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820, 821-22 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
43 See cases cited notes 44, 45 and 46 infra.
44 Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925) (option price
$47.22, purchase price $547.19; conditional sale); In re Alpha Creamery Co., Inc., 4 UCG
REP. SERV. 794 (W.D. Mich. 1967) (option price $1,481.90, list price $4,690.00; true lease);
In re Wheatland Elec. Prod. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (option price $2,006.25,
list price $8,025.00; true lease); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286,
250 A.2d 246 (1969) (option price $1,960.00, purchase price $3,400.00; true lease); Xerox
Corp. v. Smith, 9 UCC REP. SERv. 1132 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Oct. 15, 1971) (option price $15,-
000.00, purchase price $29,500.00; true lease).
45 In re Washington Processing Co., Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERv. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1966)(option price $1,350.00, three-year rental $13,972.50; conditional sale); Gibreal Auto Sales,
Inc., v. Missouri Valley Mach. Co., 186 Neb. 763, 186 N.W.2d 719 (1971) (option price
$8,580.00, three-year rental $36,000.00; true lease).
46 Burroughs Corp. v. Barry, 380 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1967) (option price $3,094.00,
market value $3,000.-$4,000.00; true lease); In re Oak Mfg., Inc., 6 UCC REp. SERV. 1273(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (option price $119.50, market value $920.00; conditional sale); In re Crown
Cartridge Corp., 220 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (option price $4,505.47, market value
$24,000.00; conditional sale).
47 Burroughs Corp. v. Barry, 380 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Oak Mfg., Inc.,
6 UCC REP. SERV. 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
48 In re Alpha Creamery Co., Inc., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 794, 797 (W.D. Mich. 1967); In
re Wheatland Elec. Prod. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
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held that, if the option price exceeds 50% of the total price of the leased property,
the lease must be regarded as bona fide as a matter of law. 9
Often the option price is variable, being subject to a deduction for all or
part of the rentals already paid at the time it is exercised. Judicial reaction to
such schemes has been diverse. An early Code case takes a strict view of this
kind of agreement:
A provision such as this in a lease readily provides a device for financing
the purchase of equipment. By crediting earlier payments of rent to the
purchase price, the lessee is accorded an equity or pecuniary interest in the
subject matter of the lease which he may recover at his option.
It would seem therefore, that whenever it can be found that a lease
agreement concerning personal property contains provisions the effect of
which are to create in the lessee an equity or pecuniary interest in the leased
property the parties are deemed as a matter of law to have intended the
lease as security within the meaning of Sections 9-102 and 1-201(37) of the
Uniform Commercial Code.5"
A more recent case goes to the opposite extreme, holding that where the "equity"
accrued will not exceed 50% of the total price the instrument is a true lease
as a matter of law. 1
One additional problem in connection with the Code's clause on nominal
option terms is presented by the decision of In re Wheatland Electric Products
Co.52 In concluding that an equipment lease was not intended as security, the
court relied on the non-sequitur that if a nominal option term makes the lease
one intended for security, a non-nominal option term indicates that it is not. The
agreement in question provided that the lessee might purchase the machinery at
any time by paying the agreed price of $8,025.00. The lessee was to be allowed
a credit, however, of from 70% to 75% of all rentals already paid to the extent
of 75% of the purchase price, so that the actual cost of exercising the option
might be as low as one-fourth of the total price. The court apparently con-
sidered its finding that such consideration was not nominal to be conclusive, since
it did not go on to consider the broader issue of whether the facts of the agree-
ment might indicate that the lease was intended as security." Other courts have
taken the same approach, concluding that if the option price is not nominal, the
lease is not intended as security. 4 The clear intent of section 1-201(37) (b),
however, is simply to set a minimum standard-a rule of exclusion whereby leases
of a certain kind cannot be regarded as true leases. It does not follow that the
absence of such an option term makes the lease ipso facto a true lease.
Decisions to date on the status of equipment leases upon the lessee's bank-
ruptcy indicate that judicial standards are too uncertain to serve as a reliable
49 Xerox Corp. v. Smith, 9 UCC REP. S Rv. 1132, 1133-34 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Oct. 15, 1971).
50 In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC REP. SERV. 342, 345-46 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
51 Xerox Corp. v. Smith, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1132, 1133-34 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Oct. 15, 1971).
52 237 F. Supp 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
53 Id. at 822.
54 In re Falco Prod. Co., 5 UCC REP. SERv. 264, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1968); In re Alpha
Creamery Co., Inc., 4 UCC REP. SERv. 794, 798 (W.D. Mich. 1967); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc.,
252 Md. 286, -, 250 A.2d 246, 247, 249 (1969); Xerox Corp. v. Smith, 9 UCC REP.
SERv. 1132, 1133-34 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Oct. 15, 1971).
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guide to prospective lessors and lessees. The basic weakness of these standards
is that they are founded on the imponderable statutory criterion of "intent."
The question of whether a lease was intended as security is a highly factual one
which has led the courts to engage in speculative assessments of the import of
particular terms of the disputed agreements. Even with consistent, well-defined
standards the scope of the filing rules would be too narrow. The old judicial
habit of looking for a conditional sale beneath the guise of a lease has severely
limited the reach of the "intended as security" clause. Even courts which have
found such an intent in the absence of an option to purchase have relied heavily
on the conclusion that the leased property would probably not be returned to the
lessor.55 Leases which bear little or no resemblance to a conditional sale remain
well outside the boundaries of article 9. It is submitted, however, that creditors
need to know of these leases, too. Though they may fall short of an undertaking
to purchase, they represent substantial, undisclosed obligations which are perti-
nent to the creditor's evaluation of the lessee's financial position. In addition,
the presence of leased equipment on the lessee's business premises may give the
false impression that they are the unencumbered assets of the lessee. The pro-
posed amendments would extend the reach of article 9 to include such "true"
leases and eliminate, or substantially reduce, the need for arduous factual inquiry
as to the intent of the parties.
III. Accounting For Equipment Leases
The inadequacy of the filing provisions with respect to equipment leases
is further aggravated by methods of reporting leases in financial statements
whereby the lessee's obligations under an equipment lease are not fully disclosed.
The lease-or-sale question has been a recognized problem in the accounting
profession for some time and remains a subject of considerable controversy. In
1964 the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants issued Opinion No. 5, "Reporting of Leases in Financial State-
ments of Lessee" which set standards for determining when a lease should be
treated as a sale. The broad policy of the Opinion is that leases which are "es-
sentially equivalent to installment purchases of property" should be treated ac-
cording to their substance rather than their legal forma This means that the
property and the related obligation will be included in the balance sheet as an
asset and a liability respectively. The standard for distinguishing between lease
and sale is the presence of terms which create, in the lessee, a "material equity" in
the property. The inclusion in the lease of either of the following features will
usually establish this factor:
a. The initial term is materially less than the useful life of the property,
and the lessee has the option to renew the lease for the remaining useful
life of the property at substantially less than the fair rental value; or
55 In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 893, 894 (C.D. Cal. 1967); In re Trans-
continental Ind., Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 235, 244 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
56 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, OPINIONS OF THE ACCOUNT-
ING PIUNCIPLES BOARD, Opinion No. 5, Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee,
Sept. 1964, 9 [hereafter cited as A.P.B. Op. No. 5].
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b. The" lessee has the right, during or at the expiration of the lease, to
acquire the property at a price which at the inception of the lease ap-
pears to be substantially less than the probable fair value of the property
at the time or times of permitted acquisition by the lessee."'
In addition, any of the following terms will "tend to indicate" that an
equity is being built up and that the lease should be treated as a sale:
a. The property was acquired by the lessor to meet the special needs of the
lessee and will probably be usable only for that purpose and only by the
lessee.
b. The term of the lease corresponds substantially to the estimated useful
life of the property, and the lessee is obligated to pay costs such as taxes,
insurance, and maintenance, which are usually considered incidental to
ownership.
c. The lessee has guaranteed the obligations of the lessor with respect to
the property leased.
d. The lessee has treated the lease as a purchase for tax purposes.""
Somewhat stricter standards are set for leases in which the parties are related.5 9
For purposes of maximum disclosure to the lessee's creditors, these APB
standards are much too vague and cumbersome. Moreover, the Board has
sharply restricted the applicability of Opinion No. 5 to leases which are (1) non-
cancelable, or cancelable only upon the occurrence of a remote contingency;
and (2) "material," individually or as a group, in relation to the lessee's net
assets or the lessee's future operations."
As to leases which are not essentially sales under the Board's guidelines,
only this broad requirement is made:
[F]inancial statements should disclose sufficient information regarding ma-
terial, non-cancelable leases which are not recorded as assets and liabilities
(see paragraphs 13 and 14) to enable the reader to assess the effect of
lease commitments upon the financial position and results of operations,
both present and prospective, of the lessee. Consequently, the financial
statements or the accompanying notes should disclose the minimum annual
rentals under such leases and the period over which the outlays will be
made."1
It should be noted that, once again, the rule is applicable only to "material,"
non-cancelable leases. In addition, the Board approves the practice of relegating
the lease obligation to a footnote in the financial statement. It has been argued
that such minimal footnote disclosure is inadequate to reveal the impact of the
lease on the lessee's credit capacity, 2 but many consider the "off balance sheet"
57 Id. 10.
58 Id. 11.
59 Id. 1 12.
60 Id. 13.
61 Id. 16.
62 Marrah, supra note 6, at 98.
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-advantages of the financing lease to be illusory."3 In any case, the fact remains
that for a great many leases which do not fall within the "material, non-
cancelable" classification, no particular balance sheet disclosure procedure is
required.
The Board is now considering revisions of the standards embodied in Opin-
ion No. 5 which would require capitalization of more leases. Considerable op-
position to broadening the standards has been voiced, however, on the theory
that an equipment lease is an executory contract and not a fixed liability.6
Critics have argued that disclosure of the lessee's obligations under the lease is
desirable, but that the general capitalization of leases is unrealistic and would
have a distorting, even misleading effect on the balance sheet of the lessee."
Whatever the eventual decision of the APB, it is clear that its present rules do
not give sufficient notice of the lease obligation to creditors, although it is also
arguable that such is not the function of the financial statement. As a result,
creditors cannot rely on the debtor's balance sheet for all the information they
might wish to have about leasing obligations. Without effective disclosure
either in the balance sheet or through filing under article 9, there exists a hiatus
in the lessee's discernible financial position, a gap which the following proposals
are intended to fill.
IV. Proposed Amendments
The principal change would be in the Code's definition of the term "security
interest." It is proposed that section 1-201(37) be amended in the following
manner: 
66
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fix-
tures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention
or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or
delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation
of a "security interest." The term also includes any interest of a buyer of
accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject to Article 9 and
the interest of a lessor in personal property or fixtures leased under an
"equipment lease" as defined in Section 9-105(1)(j). The special property
interest of a buyer of goods on identification of such goods to a contract
for sale under Section 2-401 is not a "security interest," but a buyer may
also acquire a "security interest" by complying with Article 9. Unless a
Pease or] consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder
is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any event subject to the
provisions on consignment sales (Section 2-326). [Whether a lease is in-
tended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a)
the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one
intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the
owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal con-
sideration does make the lease one intended for security.]
63 Whitman, Accounting Issues in the Capitalization of Leases, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sept.
30, 1971, at 27; Bus. WEEK, supra note 2, at 46.
64 Whitman, supra note 63; see also A.P.B. Op. No. 5, 7.
65 Zises, Law and Order in Lease Accounting, FIN. ExEc., July, 1970, at 48.
66 New language is in italics. Deletions are indicated by brackets.
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A definition of "equipment lease" should be incorporated into article 9 by the
addition to section 9-105(1) of the following sub-section (j) :
(j) "Equipment lease" means any lease of goods except:
(i) one in which the term, including all renewal periods, is less than
four months with no option to purchase;
(ii) leases of farm equipment having a purchase price of not in excess
of $2500, other than fixtures under Section 9-313 and motor vehi-
cles required to be licensed;
(iii) leases of consumer goods other than fixtures under Section 9-313 or
motor vehicles required to be licensed.
Section 9-102, which defines the policy and scope of article 9, should also be
changed by amendments to sub-sections (1) and (2):"
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state
transactions and in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article
applies so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the
jurisdiction of this state
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper,
accounts or contract rights; [and also]
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper;
(c) to any equipment lease.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract in-
cluding pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, fac-
tor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title
retention contract and [lease or] consignment intended as security. This
Article does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310.
The object of these amendments is to make the filing rules of article 9 appli-
cable to all long-term leases of commercial or industrial equipment. The new
provisions would relieve the courts of the problem of evaluating the intent of the
parties to the lease. They would also benefit creditors by increased disclosure of
a debtor's financial obligations since article 9 would extend to equipment leases
which were exempt in the past due to a narrow judicial construction of the phrase
"intended as security." This broader rule is also preferable because it better re-
flects the general definition of "security interest" in section 1-201(37) as "an
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance
of an obligation."
The exception of short-term leases under four months in duration is intended
67 Other amendments to this section have been proposed by the Permanent Editorial
Board, supra note 9.
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to relieve lessors from the filing requirements in situations where there is little
likelihood that the lessee's creditors will be misled by an appearance of owner-
ship. The four-month limit is, admittedly, arbitrary but is suggested by the use
of a four-month grace period in section 9-103(3). The exception of leases of
certain farm equipment is intended to make the definition conform to the present
Code policy which permits perfection of purchase money security interests in
such equipment without filing.18 The exception of certain consumer leases is
intended to make the definition conform to a similar policy with respect to con-
sumer goods.69 It is important to note that "equipment lease" is a defined term
with a meaning independent of the article 9 definition of "equipment." '70 This
minor ambiguity should not create any problems since most equipment leases
will involve goods which come within the definition of "equipment." It might
be preferable, however, to replace the term "equipment lease" as it has been
used in this article with some other term, such as "business lease," in order to
avoid even the slightest confusion. Undoubtedly, other problems and potential
inconsistencies would be caused by the adoption of the proposed amendments.
The following suggestions are intended to deal with them but make no pretense
of being exhaustive.
The definitions of "collateral," "debtor," and "secured party" under section
9-105 should be amended to reflect the treatment of an equipment lease as
creating a security interest:
(c) "Collateral" means the property subject to a security interest, and in-
cludes accounts, contract rights, and chattel paper which have been
sold and goods leased under an equipment lease;
(d) "Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other performance
of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the
collateral, and includes the seller of accounts, contract rights or chattel
paper and the lessee under an equipment lease. Where the debtor and
the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the term "debtor"
means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing
with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with the obli-
gation, and may include both where the context so requires;
(i) "Secured party" means a lender, seller or other person in whose favor
there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts, con-
tract rights or chattel paper have been sold and the lessor under an
equipment lease. When the holders of obligations issued under an in-
denture of trust, equipment trust agreement or the like are represented
by a trustee or other person, the representative is the secured party.
Section 9-311 on the alienability of a debtor's rights in the collateral would,
in its present form, impose an undue burden on the contractual freedom of the
parties to a lease. It is suggested that the equipment lease be excepted from that
section:
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily
68 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.302(1) (c).
69 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(1) (d).
70 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(2).
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transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy,
garnishment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the
security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute
a default, except where such a provision appears in an equipment lease.
Without this amendment the effect of section 9-311 on equipment leases would
be to give lessees a general right of alienation which they do not now have. The
lessor of equipment could not provide himself with the reasonable protection of a
conventional default clause. In the case of a "true" lessor who, under the present
rules, is not required to file a financing statement, this would add insult to injury.
The proposed amendments would not only impose upon him the burden of per-
fecting his interest in leased property, but they would nullify an important de-
fault clause in his agreement with the lessee. The best solution is a broad excep-
tion of all equipment leases from section 9-311. This may result in a diminution
of the assets available for levy by the lessee's creditors (especially where the terms
of the lease give him an equity interest in the property). That disadvantage is
outweighed, however, by the benefit of broader notice requirements under the
proposed amendments.
The interest of the lessor in the leased property should also be protected
from the holder of a security interest in the lessee's "after-acquired property" by
the addition of the following subsection (7) to section 9-312 on priorities among
conflicting security interests:
(7) The security interest of the lessor under an equipment lease has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if the
lessor's interest is perfected at the time the lessee receives possession of the
collateral or within ten days thereafter.
This provision gives the lessor the same protection as that afforded by subsection
(4) to holders of purchase money security interests in collateral other than inven-
tory.
V. Conclusion
The approach of current statutory and judicial rules to the security aspects
of equipment leasing is inadequate. The emphasis of sections 1-201(37) and
9-102(2) on the intent of the parties has left enforcement of article 9 in a factual
quagmire. Judicial interpretation of the term "lease intended as security" has
so limited the applicability of article 9 with respect to leases that it reaches only
the grossest attempts to disguise what are essentially financing transactions. At
present a debtor may undertake substantial lease obligations which the lessor is
not required to perfect by any form of notice to the lessee's creditors. The failure
of the courts to recognize the security factor inherent in any equipment lease
and the need of creditors to be aware of such leases is compounded by incomplete
disclosure, under current accounting principles, of lease information in the finan-
cial reports of the lessee. The foregoing proposals are submitted as a possible
remedy of this situation.
Michael J. Cunningham
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